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THE COMMON LAW PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY AND 
SECONDARY LEGISLATION 
 
 
DAN MEAGHER* AND MATTHEW GROVES** 
 
I   INTRODUCTION 
The most famous contemporary exposition of the common law principle of 
legality comes from the judgment of Lord Hoffman in R v Secretary of State for 
the Home Department; Ex parte Simms (‘Ex parte Simms’): 
the principle of legality means that Parliament must squarely confront what it is 
doing and accept the political cost. Fundamental rights cannot be overridden by 
general or ambiguous words. This is because there is too great a risk that the full 
implications of their unqualified meaning may have passed unnoticed in the 
democratic process. In the absence of express language or necessary implication to 
the contrary, the courts therefore presume that even the most general words were 
intended to be subject to the basic rights of the individual.1 
Interestingly enough, the case itself concerned the application of the principle 
to secondary not primary legislation. There is an irony that a leading modern 
principle that has proved so influential in statutory interpretation arose in a case 
about the scope of a clause in secondary legislation but the courts have long 
exercised supervisory control over delegated legislation.2 In modern times, Ex 
parte Simms is one of many English cases in which the principle of legality  
has been used to determine the validity of secondary legislation. 3  Important 
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1  [2000] 2 AC 115, 131.  
2  In Toussaint v A-G (St Vincent and the Grenadines) [2007] 1 WLR 2825, 2833 [18], the Privy Council 
traced the power (and duty) of courts to review delegated legislation to at least the Bill of Rights 1688, 1 
Wm & M sess 2, c 2, art 9.  
3  See, eg, Ahmed v Her Majesty’s Treasury [2010] 2 AC 534 (‘Ahmed’) (Order in Council which allowed 
freezing of assets of people and banks without any rights of fairness or recourse to the courts held invalid 
because empowering statute did not authorise the executive to override such basic common law rights). 
English cases prior to Ex parte Simms used a very similar methodology but no express reference to the 
principle of legality. See, eg, Raymond v Honey [1983] 1 AC 1 (‘Honey’) (prison rule restricting 
prisoners’ right of access to the courts held invalid because empowering statute did not clearly authorise 
such restrictions on such a basic common law right); R v Lord Chancellor; Ex parte Witham [1998] QB 
575 (‘Ex parte Witham’) (rule of court that greatly raised court fees held invalid because empowering 
statute did not clearly authorise such a restriction on a basic common law right).  
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Australian cases have also involved the application of the principle of legality to 
secondary legislation.4 In one sense such cases reflect a longstanding tradition by 
which the courts will declare delegated legislation invalid if, for some reason, it 
conflicts with the terms of the statute under which it is made.5 Relevantly, the 
leading Australian treatise on delegated legislation states that: 
the courts have adopted a number of basic assumptions with which they approach 
the interpretation of legislation. It is assumed, for example, that legislation will not 
allow the acquisition of property without compensation or deprive a person of the 
right to appeal against an adverse judicial decision. The assumptions are also 
applicable to delegated legislation, but their effect in regard to such legislation is 
very different from their effect in relation to Acts … with delegated legislation, if 
an assumption and the terms of the legislation are incompatible, it is the delegated 
legislation which must give way. Unless there is clear authority in an empowering 
Act for delegated legislation to override an assumption, the delegated legislation 
will be invalid.6 
This correctly states the general common law approach (and interpretive 
principle) in our view – that legislation will only succeed in infringing 
fundamental common law rights and freedoms if expressed in unmistakably clear 
language – and how that approach applies to delegated legislation which 
infringes such common law rights. In these cases, the question is not whether the 
delegated legislation is expressed with sufficient clarity but whether the statutory 
power under which it is made is expressed with the clarity the courts require.7 
According to this view, delegated legislation may only infringe common law 
rights, freedoms and principles if the empowering statute provides that power 
expressly or by necessary implication. But the cases noted above (and others to 
be discussed below) suggest that the proper relationship between the principle of 
legality and secondary legislation remains equivocal, if not contested, in 
Australia. 
In this article we aim to outline what that relationship is in Australia 
presently and what it ought to be as a matter of precedent, principle and logic. In 
order to do so, the article will proceed as follows. Part II examines the nature of 
delegated legislation and its capacity to infringe rights, freedoms and principles 
considered fundamental at common law. In Parts III–V we trace a long line of 
common law authorities and the contemporary renovation of the principle of 
legality in order to articulate what, in our view, is the proper relationship between 
                                                 
4  See, eg, Evans v New South Wales (2008) 168 FCR 576 (‘Evans’) in the Federal Court and A-G (SA) v 
Adelaide City Corporation (2013) 249 CLR 1 (‘City of Adelaide’) in the High Court.  
5  H W R Wade and C F Forsyth, Administrative Law (Oxford University Press, 11th ed, 2014) 724–5. 
Wade and Forsyth suggest that courts became much more willing to rigorously examine secondary 
legislation in the second half of the 19th century, when the volume and influence of secondary legislation 
expanded. 
6  Dennis Pearce and Stephen Argument, Delegated Legislation in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 4th 
ed, 2012) 308 (citations omitted). 
7  It has been suggested that there is ‘an important distinction between reading down and not extending the 
ordinary meaning of a word’ in legislation: Nightingale v Blacktown City Council (2015) 212 LGERA 99, 
108 [34] (Basten JA). We note that this distinction is not relevant to our discussion because the clarity 
required by the principle of legality can be explained as either reading down the words of the relevant 
statute, or not extending them, or perhaps both.  
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the principle and secondary legislation. Our conception of that relationship is 
then considered and assessed in light of the approach to secondary legislation 
taken recently by senior appellate courts in Australia. Then, in Part VI, we 
highlight two interpretive issues that arise when the construction of secondary 
legislation implicates both the common law (the principle of legality) and the 
Constitution (the implied freedom of political communication). We conclude in 
Part VII with observations on some important issues regarding the proper 
relationship of the principle of legality and secondary legislation and how that 
interpretive approach might be further developed in light of the principle’s 
contemporary normative justification.  
 
II   THE NATURE OF SECONDARY LEGISLATION (AND ITS 
CAPACITY TO INFRINGE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS) 
Secondary legislation has many forms and many different names. Yet a 
quality common to all is that it is not debated in or enacted by Parliament. 
Secondary legislation is something else, though precisely what it is has long 
provoked debate. An influential early term used by Megarry was that of ‘quasi-
legislation’, which he thought could cover the administrative rules, policies and 
announcements that proliferated in the post-war period.8 A more recent term is 
‘soft law’, which is used to describe policies, rules, guidelines, administrative 
manuals, disciplinary codes and the like which are promulgated by administrative 
agencies and bodies.9 As with quasi-legislation, soft law is a description that can 
cover an extremely wide range of instruments used or promulgated by 
departments and agencies of government.10  Soft law is generally accepted to 
extend beyond those instruments which are made under direct parliamentary 
authority.11  
The clear basis of parliamentary authority is a key feature of the secondary 
legislation examined in this article. We are concerned with those instruments 
made under legislative authority to promulgate non-statutory rules, whether by 
the name of statutory rule, 12  legislative instrument, 13  subsidiary legislation, 14 
                                                 
8  R E Megarry, ‘Administrative Quasi-Legislation’ (1944) 60 Law Quarterly Review 125.  
9  This list draws on Mark Aronson, ‘Private Bodies, Public Power and Soft Law in the High Court’ (2007) 
35 Federal Law Review 1, 3. The concept is examined in detail in Greg Weeks, Soft Law and Public 
Authorities: Remedies and Reform (Hart Publishing, 2016). 
10  Robin Creyke and John McMillan note that the meaning of soft law remains vague and suggest that a 
definition should focus on the effect rather than status of such instruments: Robin Creyke and John 
McMillan, ‘Soft Law v Hard Law’ in Linda Pearson, Carol Harlow and Michael Taggart (eds), 
Administrative Law in a Changing State: Essays in Honour of Mark Aronson (Hart Publishing, 2008) 
377, 380. 
11  Greg Weeks, ‘The Use and Enforcement of Soft Law by Australian Public Authorities’ (2014) 42 Federal 
Law Review 181, 182–3.  
12  A term used in the Subordinate Legislation Act 1989 (NSW) s 3(1); Subordinate Legislation Act 1994 
(Vic) s 3(1). 
13  A term used in the Legislation Act 2003 (Cth) s 8; Subordinate Legislation Act 1994 (Vic) s 3(1).  
14  A term used in the Interpretation Act 1984 (WA) pt VI.  
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council by-law,15 or other such local government rules.16 These and other forms 
of secondary legislation are made under parliamentary authority because the 
power to make such legislation is provided by laws which expressly allow the 
making of it. Parliament may provide the authority to make such instruments but 
does not itself make the law. The power to make secondary legislation is almost 
always accompanied by a parliamentary power to disallow that legislation.17 
There are, moreover, various forms of parliamentary scrutiny of the making of 
secondary legislation, but these oversight functions normally operate after 
secondary legislation has been made.18 
Secondary or delegated legislation has long been used by governments but 
the concept of legislation made by a body other than Parliament does not sit 
easily with notions of parliamentary sovereignty or democratic accountability. 
Strong criticisms about the use of delegated legislation arose in the first part of 
the last century, mainly in response to the perceived growth of bureaucratic 
power. The influential work of Lord Hewart railed against the use of delegated 
legislation, which he saw as a key part of the bureaucratic plot to seize 
parliamentary power and create a ‘new despotism’ that would place 
administrative might above the sovereignty of Parliament and beyond the 
jurisdiction of the courts. 19  Those concerns sparked a parliamentary review, 
known as the Donoughmore Committee,20 which rejected all of his criticisms. 
The report of that committee identified the following reasons to support the use 
of delegated legislation: the pressure on Parliament’s time was so great that it 
needed relief from the detail required in legislation; modern legislation was often 
required to include a level of technicality that was thought better managed 
outside the proceedings of Parliament;21 the legislative process was often not the 
best means of official response to urgent or unforeseen issues; the process to 
make delegated legislation was more flexible; delegated legislation provided a 
                                                 
15  A term used in many local government statutes such as the Local Government Act 1999 (SA) ch 12 pt 1.  
16  See, eg, Local Government Act 1989 (Vic) pt 5, which terms such instruments as ‘local laws’.  
17  The most novel instance is the Legislation Act 2012 (NZ) ss 4, 38. Section 4 defines ‘legislative 
instrument’ very broadly, to include rules, by-laws, various official notices, regulations and Orders in 
Council made under a statute. Section 38 enables all legislative instruments to be disallowed. The effect 
is to make virtually any instrument that is made under a statute and has general application disallowable 
by Parliament.  
18  Secondary legislation is normally subject to disallowance by either House of Parliament. See, eg, 
Interpretation Act 1984 (WA) s 42(2) (either House of Parliament may disallow any secondary legislation 
within 14 days of it being tabled). 
19  Lord Hewart, The New Despotism (Ernest Benn, 1929) 14, 20. Influential criticisms of delegated 
legislation were also made by the Canadian scholar Willis, though he ultimately conceded the necessity 
of delegated legislation: John Willis, ‘The Delegation of Legislative and Judicial Powers to 
Administrative Bodies: A Study of the Report of the Committee on Ministers’ Powers’ (1932) 18 Iowa 
Law Review 150. 
20  United Kingdom, Report of the Committee on Ministers’ Powers, Cmd 4060 (1932). 
21  A refined version of this argument often used nowadays is that secondary legislation allows use of the 
expertise of officials outside Parliament, which can be essential in technical rules such as those needed 
for specialist regulation of financial markets, complex manufacturing industries etc: Andrew Green, 
‘Regulations and Rule Making: The Dilemma of Delegation’ in Colleen M Flood and Lorne Sossin (eds), 
Administrative Law in Context (Emond Montgomery Publications, 2nd ed, 2013) 125, 127. 
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means for governments to experiment with novel approaches; and delegated 
legislation was especially suited to times of emergency.22 
Many of these arguments are now made against primary legislation because 
there is increasing criticism about the volume and complexity of the legislation 
that Parliaments routinely enact.23 The potential of many such laws to remove or 
restrict basic rights was recently the subject of a major inquiry by the Australian 
Law Reform Commission about the encroachment of rights and freedoms by 
federal legislation.24 But the debate over the merit of secondary legislation raises 
further difficulties and has continued in modern times, though the issues have 
arguably refined. While many remain concerned about the rise of executive and 
administrative power, few would agree with Lord Hewart’s suggestion that 
delegated legislation is the main or only source of that problem.25 The modern 
criticisms of secondary legislation note that it ‘often has more impact on the lives 
of ordinary citizens than do most full-blown acts of Parliament’.26 Secondary 
legislation is also regularly criticised for its poor drafting, its great variety and 
vast number, and the related problem that it is often difficult to access.27  
We add a further criticism that secondary legislation can adversely affect 
basic rights and freedoms. It should do so only in exceptional circumstances but 
such cautions may often not be observed. This possibility arises partly from the 
sheer volume of secondary legislation. 28  It permeates every level of modern 
government, particularly local government where the amount and influence of 
secondary legislation usually outstrips that of primary legislation. As a result, 
secondary legislation can infringe rights and freedoms and do so without 
attracting significant attention because it can easily pass unnoticed as one small 
aspect of the large amount of secondary legislation created by central and local 
governments. In our view, that raises a concern related to, but distinct from, the 
longstanding criticisms that the powers to make secondary legislation allow an 
impermissible delegation of legislative authority. Even if one fully accepts the 
virtues of secondary legislation, such as to provide technical or administrative 
                                                 
22  Very similar reasons for the use of delegated legislation are given in Pearce and Argument, above n 6, 6–
9. 
23  See, eg, D C Pearce and R S Geddes, Statutory Interpretation in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 8th 
ed, 2014) 2–3. Pearce and Geddes briefly track the enormous growth in federal legislation in recent 
decades.  
24  See Australian Law Reform Commission, Traditional Rights and Freedoms – Encroachments by 
Commonwealth Laws, Report No 129 (2015). 
25  See, eg, Neil Duxbury, Elements of Legislation (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 41, who concludes 
that the ‘modern redistribution of legislative power from parliament to government is attributable to more 
than just the growth of subordinate legislation’. 
26  Michael Taggart, ‘From “Parliamentary Powers” to Privitization: The Chequered History of Delegated 
Legislation in the Twentieth Century’ (2005) 55 University of Toronto Law Journal 575, 575. 
27  Pearce and Argument, above n 6, 16–20. Many such arguments are made against primary legislation. See, 
eg, Alec Samuels, ‘Ensuring Standards in the Quality of Legislation’ (2013) 34 Statute Law Review 296, 
in which longstanding problems about the quality of legislation in the United Kingdom are examined. 
28  Though it has also been noted that the growth of legislation has continued at a great pace, which may 
have fostered an increased use of the principle of legality. See DPP v Kaba (2014) 44 VR 526, 576 [175] 
(Bell J), citing Paul Finn, ‘Statutes and the Common Law’ (1992) 22 University of Western Australia Law 
Review 7, 11. 
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detail in particular areas of government, the willingness to accept such legislation 
may lessen when it infringes basic rights and freedoms. Secondary legislation 
which does so also sits uneasily with Lord Hoffmann’s requirement in Ex parte 
Simms that Parliament must ‘squarely confront what it is doing’29 when seeking 
to remove or narrow fundamental rights. Parliament hardly does so in secondary 
legislation because its role is typically limited to considering that legislation at 
some point after it is made. Our concern is therefore not that secondary 
legislation cannot remove or restrict basic rights and freedoms but that, as a 
general rule, it should not.  
Parliaments and governments offer a range of indirect guidance on this issue. 
Parliamentary guidance takes the form of statutes which provide some standards 
for secondary legislation but none clearly prohibit secondary legislation from 
removing or restricting basic rights or freedoms. In some instances this guidance 
makes clear that legislative removal or restriction of important rights should, as a 
matter of principle, be done by statute rather than secondary legislation. The 
Legislation Handbook issued by the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet 
notes that, while ‘it is not possible or desirable to provide a prescriptive list of 
matters that should be included in primary legislation and matters that should be 
included in subordinate legislation’, matters which ‘have a significant impact on 
individual rights and liberties’ should be implemented by statute rather than 
secondary legislation.30  The Legislation Handbook also makes clear that this 
principle is a general one that should be decided by the relevant circumstances  
of each case.31 Another example is the Legislative Standards Act 1992 (Qld) 
which affirms several ‘fundamental legislative principles’ that underpin 
parliamentary democracy, including whether legislation ‘has sufficient regard to 
rights and liberties of individuals’.32  One indicator of the observance of that 
guiding principle is that secondary legislation ‘does not adversely affect rights 
and liberties, or impose obligations, retrospectively’.33 Separate legislation makes 
this and other fundamental legislative principles ones by which parliamentary 
committees should gauge the lawfulness of secondary legislation.34 A similar 
arrangement prevails in Victoria, requiring the Scrutiny of Acts and Regulations 
Committee to report on whether secondary legislation ‘unduly trespasses on 
                                                 
29  [2001] 2 AC 115, 131 (emphasis added). 
30  Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Legislation Handbook (1999) 3 <https://www.dpmc.gov.au/ 
sites/default/files/publications/Legislation_Handbook.pdf>. In our view, the Legislation Handbook 
provides the framework within which more recent documents from other agencies must be understood. 
See, eg, Office of Parliamentary Counsel, Guide to Reducing Complexity in Legislation (17 May 2011) 
<https://www.opc.gov.au/about/docs/ReducingComplexity.pdf>. While that document might be seen to 
encourage placing more matters within secondary legislation, it does not detract from the guidance in the 
Legislation Handbook that legislation should be the vehicle to remove or restrict basic rights. 
31  Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, above n 30, 4. The Legislation Handbook elsewhere makes 
clear that secondary legislation is suited for matters of detail: at 34–5. A more elaborate explanation is 
given in Administrative Review Council, ‘Report to the Attorney-General: Rule Making by 
Commonwealth Agencies’ (Report No 35, 25 March 1992) 12–16.  
32  Legislative Standards Act 1992 (Qld) ss 4(1), (3). 
33  Legislative Standards Act 1992 (Qld) s 4(3)(g). 
34  Parliament of Queensland Act 2001 (Qld) s 93. 
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rights and liberties of the person previously established by law’.35 A similar but 
very sparse example is the Senate Standing Order which guides the equivalent 
federal parliamentary committee. That Order provides that the Commonwealth 
Senate Standing Committee on Regulations and Ordinances should scrutinise 
secondary legislation to ensure ‘that it does not unduly trespass on personal rights 
and liberties’.36 
In recent times, many Australian Parliaments have created committees and 
procedures to scrutinise legislation for compliance with human rights.37 These 
committees are primarily directed to the scrutiny of bills but typically also 
examine secondary legislation. The activities of these committees suggest that 
they can force government departments to clearly explain why secondary 
legislation that adversely affects basic rights was thought necessary. In some 
instances, the work of those committees can extract detailed information and 
explanation from government departments.38 
There are similar processes governing the making and parliamentary  
scrutiny of secondary legislation in every Australian jurisdiction.39 In our view, 
these parliamentary processes and statutes governing secondary legislation 
contain several apparent shortcomings. The guiding principles often say  
little about the rights and freedoms they are expressed to protect. While many 
statutes governing the making and review of secondary legislation list  
specific rights and freedoms,40 none are exhaustive. It is also notable that these 
guiding principles for secondary legislation are exactly that – they indicate  
how secondary legislation ought to be made and reviewed. None have the force 
of law or automatic operation. In other words, these principles discourage  
rather than prohibit governments and their agencies from making secondary 
legislation removing or infringing basic rights. They similarly encourage 
parliamentary committees to examine secondary legislation to ensure that it does 
not remove or infringe basic rights but leave any decision on whether secondary 
legislation should be disallowed for contravening these guiding principles to the 
                                                 
35  Subordinate Legislation Act 1994 (Vic) s 21(1)(f) (emphasis added). The same principle is contained in 
Legislation Review Act 1987 (NSW) s 9(1)(b)(i). 
36  Senate, Parliament of Australia, Standing Orders and Other Orders of the Senate, August 2015, O 
23(3)(b) <http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Chamber_documents/Senate_chamber_ 
documents/standingorders>. 
37  The federal committee is examined in George Williams and Lisa Burton, ‘Australia’s Exclusive 
Parliamentary Model of Rights Protection’ (2013) 34 Statute Law Review 58.  
38  See, eg, the lengthy correspondence on a piece of secondary legislation, the Telecommunications 
(Interception and Access) Amendment (Public Interest Advocates and Other Matters) Regulation 2015 
(Cth), in Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights, Parliament of Australia, Human Rights 
Scrutiny Report: 35th Report of the 44th Parliament (2016) app 1 <http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_ 
Business/Committees/Joint/Human_Rights/Completed_inquiries/2016/Thirty-fifth_report_of_the_44th_ 
Parliament>. 
39  Many are usefully examined by Pearce and Argument, above n 6, 59–126. 
40  A common principle is the one against retrospective legislation. Many regimes governing secondary 
legislation require scrutiny and reporting of legislation that has retrospective effect, though usually only if 
this is done under a statute that does not clearly authorise the creation of secondary legislation with such 
an effect. See, eg, Subordinate Legislation Act 1994 (Vic) s 21(1)(b)(i).  
2016 The Common Law Principle of Legality and Secondary Legislation 457
committee.41 In many instances, that may mean that parliamentary committees 
undertake detailed inquiries but hesitate to recommend disallowance of 
secondary legislation.42 
The value of parliamentary scrutiny should not be assumed without question. 
While it is clear that potential disallowance provides a ‘powerful incentive’ to 
ensure that secondary legislation does not breach principles that may make it 
unlawful,43 the utility of parliamentary scrutiny processes is often doubted. A 
former Clerk to the House of Lords Committee responsible for the oversight of 
secondary legislation suggests there was ‘widespread agreement that 
Parliament’s consideration of secondary legislation is second rate’.44 While many 
of the mechanisms just discussed can and do provide useful review, it is clear 
that the focus of Parliament is on primary rather than secondary legislation and 
this appears unlikely to change.45 
The most notable feature of the guiding principles is that they presume 
secondary legislation can remove or narrow basic rights. An example is the 
Victorian provision noted above, which requires the Scrutiny of Acts and 
Regulations Committee to report on secondary legislation that unduly trespasses 
on rights and liberties. A mandate that the Committee is to report when 
secondary legislation unduly infringes rights and liberties implies that secondary 
legislation may duly, or perhaps the better term is ‘appropriately’, infringe basic 
rights. When can such an infringement by secondary legislation be appropriate? 
The statutes and rules governing secondary legislation and the parliamentary 
committees which review secondary legislation provide no clear answer. In our 
view, at least some of the solution is judicially provided by the principle of 
                                                 
41  This problem is not limited to the parliamentary scrutiny of secondary legislation because other 
parliamentary scrutiny committees, such as those which examine bills according to human rights 
principles, are also ultimately required to decide questions of compliance according to their own 
judgment. Importantly, this approach excludes any meaningful role for the courts. See Williams and 
Burton, above n 37, 91–2. But for an argument that the court may still have an important role in this 
context see Dan Meagher, ‘The Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011 (Cth) and the Courts’ 
(2014) 42 Federal Law Review 1, 13–24.  
42  The example mentioned above in Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights, above n 38, is a 
useful illustration. The report of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights concluded that the 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Public Interest Advocates and Other 
Matters) Regulation 2015 (Cth) might be incompatible with Australia’s obligations under international 
human rights law but the report neither recommended disallowance of the regulation nor any further 
action: at 25. 
43  Jonathan Hunt, ‘The Regulations Review Committee’ [1999] New Zealand Law Journal 402, 404. 
44  Philippa Tudor, ‘Secondary Legislation: Second Class or Crucial?’ (2000) 21 Statute Law Review 149, 
150. 
45  See, eg, Murray Hunt, Hayley J Hooper and Paul Yowell (eds), Parliaments and Human Rights: 
Redressing the Democratic Deficit (Hart Publishing, 2015). That detailed work examines how 
Parliaments can better protect rights and concludes by providing a lengthy statement of draft principles 
and guidelines that essentially provide a ‘best practice’ model for Parliaments’ consideration and 
protection of rights. The sole mention of secondary legislation, states that ‘[i]f resources permit’ a 
suitable committee ‘could also scrutinise secondary legislation for human rights compatibility’. They 
further state that ‘parliaments should also ensure that mechanisms exist for identifying significant human 
rights issues raised by secondary legislation’ if ‘resources permit’: at 492 (emphasis added). Such 
statements confirm that many scholars regard secondary legislation as something of an afterthought.  
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legality. The next Part explains the longstanding authority to support that 
proposition.  
  
III   THE PROPER RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PRINCIPLE 
OF LEGALITY AND SECONDARY LEGISLATION 
Pearce and Argument note that, while the jurisdiction of the courts to review 
and declare invalid secondary legislation is longstanding, the courts were 
traditionally reluctant to exercise that power over secondary legislation made by 
those such as ministers and local councils ‘whose primary accountability lay to 
their electors’.46 At the same time, however, many key cases about secondary 
legislation concerned local council by-laws and left no doubt that courts could 
and would, if necessary, strike down secondary legislation promulgated by local 
councils.47 An important early case from 1922 was the High Court’s decision in 
City of Melbourne v Barry (‘Barry’).48 It involved a successful challenge to the 
validity of a council by-law that provided:  
No processions of persons or of vehicles … shall, except for military or funeral 
purposes, parade or pass through any street unless with the previous consent in 
writing of the Council given under the hand of the Town Clerk and by the route 
specified in such consent, and unless and until the recipient of such consent has 
given at least twenty-four hours’ notice with particulars of such consent and route 
to the officer in charge of the City Police.49 
The by-law was held ultra vires the lawmaking powers provided by section 6 
of the Police Offences Act 1915 (Vic) and section 197 of the Local Government 
Act 1915 (Vic), even though the latter permitted the making of council by-laws 
for the purpose of regulating traffic and processions.  
There were at least three reasons offered by the Court for the by-law’s 
invalidity. First, Isaacs J held that the power to regulate processions did not 
authorise the Council to prohibit processions except those it might allow. 50 
Justice Higgins added that this complete prohibition of processions (save for 
military or funeral processions) was in excess of the power conferred by section 
197 of the Local Government Act 1915 (Vic) because ‘if valid, the Council will 
be enabled to prohibit a procession because of its nature or purpose’.51 Secondly, 
Higgins J held that even if section 197 did authorise a by-law that prohibited a 
procession on account of its nature or purpose, it was still invalid for 
impermissibly delegating this power to an ‘ordinary council meeting’ contrary to 
the terms of the rule making power.52 Finally, and most relevantly for present 
                                                 
46  Pearce and Argument, above n 6, 174. 
47  The willingness of courts to do so has a long history. An early such example is City of London v Wood 
(1702) 12 Mod 669, 678; 88 ER 1592, 1597 (Holt CJ). 
48  (1922) 31 CLR 174. 
49  Ibid 175. 
50  Ibid 199–200. 
51  Ibid 207–8. 
52  Ibid 208. 
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purposes, Isaacs J and Higgins J noted that the by-law infringed the common law 
right to free use of the highway and both reasoned that the interference with such 
a right raised different, harder-edged concerns than conventional notions of ultra 
vires. Justice Higgins held ‘that any interference with a common law right cannot 
be justified except by statute – by express words or necessary implication’.53 
Justice Isaacs said that ‘citizens are entitled to know to what extent their common 
law rights are restricted’.54 He reasoned: 
Common justice … dictates that except where the Legislature has clearly 
empowered a council to make its own unfettered and unregulated will at the 
moment the test of legality or illegality, a council having the power of ‘regulating 
by by-law’ should state its requirements in the by-law as explicitly as 
circumstances reasonably permit. Otherwise, how are individuals to attempt to 
conform to law without a total surrender of their right innocently and 
unaggressively to use the King’s highway in company on occasions that 
frequently represent great and important national, political, social, religious or 
industrial movements or opinions? It would require very explicit words in an Act 
of Parliament to induce me to believe the Legislature, in the name of regulation, 
contemplated such unregulated authority as is assumed by the by-law before us.55 
In contemporary parlance, once the relevant by-law engaged a common law 
right both Justices directly applied the principle of legality to the lawmaking 
power. And in the absence of express words or necessary implication in the 
empowering statute to prohibit the free use of highways, that common law right 
could not be infringed by a regulation made under a power that was expressed in 
only general terms. That, in our view, is the correct approach to the construction 
of a lawmaking power when secondary legislation sourced to it engages 
fundamental common law rights and freedoms.  
Instructive also is the 1960 High Court case of Lynch v Brisbane City 
Council (‘Lynch’). 56  In it Dixon CJ outlined the proper scope of lawmaking 
authority conferred on local councils empowered to make ordinances for 
promoting and maintaining the peace, comfort, welfare, and convenience of the 
city and its inhabitants.57 The empowering statute provided that ordinances could 
be made on 
generally all … matters, and things in [the Council’s] opinion necessary or 
conducive to the good government of the City and the wellbeing of its 
inhabitants.58  
This power was held to support the validity of an ordinance that provided:  
A person shall not use a stall on any land, for the display or sale of goods, unless 
there is subsisting licence under this Ordinance for that stall on that land …59  
The appellant owned and operated an unlicensed fruit and vegetable stall in a 
private laneway in Brisbane and failed in his challenge to the ordinance. 
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Lynch is significant for a number of reasons. It is considered the leading 
Australian authority on the proper scope of ‘[t]he general power to make by-laws 
for “the good rule and government” of a municipality’ which is ‘a frequent 
empowering provision found in local government legislation’.60  Chief Justice 
Dixon acknowledged that ‘they are expressions of a kind which in such contexts 
have caused courts difficulty for a very long time’ and contain words that are 
‘wide and indefinite’.61 Even so, they should be given an ordinary (not narrow) 
construction which in the context of the relevant statute under consideration 
‘gave a power to lay down rules in respect of matters of municipal concern’.62 He 
continued: 
The words are not to be applied without caution nor read as if they were designed 
to confide to the city more than matters of local government. They express no 
exact limit of power but, directed as they are to the welfare and good government 
of a city and its inhabitants, they are not to be read as going beyond the accepted 
notions of local government.63 
To ascertain the proper scope of such lawmaking powers (and by-laws made 
pursuant to them), Dixon CJ emphasised the centrality of statutory context. That 
is a sound approach to the interpretation (and characterisation) of secondary – 
indeed all – legislation. It was endorsed recently in the judgments of Hayne J and 
Bell J in Attorney-General (SA) v City of Adelaide City Corporation (‘City of 
Adelaide’).64 But what is interesting for present purposes is that in Lynch Dixon 
CJ did not consider whether the common law rights presumption (now termed the 
principle of legality) had any role to play in construing the scope of the relevant 
lawmaking power. That is the logically prior interpretive issue in our view. There 
may of course have been a simple explanation for this. If there was no common 
law right to engage in trade and commerce, the city ordinance did not engage the 
rights presumption. There was, however, High Court authority at the time 
suggesting otherwise.65  
There is, then, a clear basis to suggest that Dixon CJ in Lynch ought to have 
considered the applicability of the rights presumption (principle of legality) to the 
relevant parts of the empowering statute noted above. And that is so 
notwithstanding the soundness of the general approach to the interpretation and 
characterisation of secondary legislation that his Honour outlined. Moreover, it 
may well have been the case that the subject matter of the empowering statute in 
Lynch and the purposes for which it conferred lawmaking power on the Brisbane 
City Council necessarily implied that some interference with common law rights 
and freedoms – such as the freedom to carry on one’s own business and trade – 
was authorised. That is, Chief Justice Dixon’s construction of the scope of the 
lawmaking power in Lynch may have been correct in that local government 
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context in any event. Indeed, the necessary implication point in the context of 
empowering statutes that provide lawmaking powers to local councils is an 
important one. We will consider it in more detail below. The issue is not whether 
common law rights and freedoms can be limited or abrogated by secondary 
legislation – clearly enough they can be. But as the High Court made clear in 
Barry, in order to do so the empowering statute must provide that power by 
express words or necessary implication.  
The High Court employed a similar approach to Dixon CJ in Lynch in its 
1984 decision in Foley v Padley (‘Foley’).66 The case involved an unsuccessful 
challenge to a by-law made by the City of Adelaide Council pursuant to section 
11(1)(a) of the Rundle Street Mall Act 1975 (SA). This gave the Council power 
to make by-laws  
regulating, controlling or prohibiting any activity in the Mall or any activity in the 
vicinity of the Mall that is, in the opinion of the Council, likely to affect the use or 
enjoyment of the Mall …  
The appellant was charged with giving out an item of printed material to a 
passer-by in the Rundle Mall without the Council’s permission contrary to the 
following by-law:  
8. No person shall give out or distribute anything in the Mall or in any public 
place adjacent to the Mall to any bystander or passer-by without the permission of 
the council. 
The by-law operated to interfere with the appellant’s common law rights to 
liberty and free expression. Chief Justice Gibbs noted that effect and also that a 
‘principle of legality’-style argument was made by counsel for the appellant, who 
submitted ‘that a statutory provision will not be construed as interfering with the 
liberty of the individual unless an intention to do so clearly appears, and as a 
general proposition that is correct’. 67  But Gibbs CJ was concerned that ‘the 
unrestrained exercise in or near the Mall of the freedom to speak or communicate 
opinions might, in some circumstances, have an adverse effect on the use or 
enjoyment of the Mall’. 68  That was surely correct as a factual and practical 
matter. It led to the following construction of the lawmaking power conferred by 
section 11: 
The legislature has left it to the Council to decide whether it should regulate, 
control or prohibit an activity if, in the opinion of the Council, it is likely to affect 
the use or enjoyment of the Mall, even if the regulation, control or prohibition will 
to some extent limit the freedom of speech or communication of those engaging in 
the activity … In the end, the question for the courts is simply whether the Council 
could reasonably have formed the opinion that the activity is likely to affect the 
use or enjoyment of the Mall.69 
But as the by-law engaged fundamental common law rights (as Gibbs CJ 
himself noted) that was not the only interpretive question that required judicial 
determination. The logically prior question was whether the lawmaking power 
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conferred on the Council by section 11 permitted the infringement of common 
law rights and freedoms. And as the High Court made clear in Barry, the 
empowering statute must do so by express words or necessary implication. There 
was certainly nothing express in the wording of section 11 that did so. On the 
contrary, the defining characteristic of section 11 was the breadth of the 
lawmaking power it conferred on the Council. Justice Murphy noted as much in 
his dissenting judgment when he explained that ‘[i]f freedom of expression is to 
be maintained by-laws which may be used to restrict expression must be clearly 
authorized by the enabling legislation’.70 But, again, one might reasonably argue 
that it is necessarily implied from the very nature and purpose of this species of 
local government lawmaking power that at least some interference with common 
law rights (such as speech, communication and liberty) is authorised to regulate, 
control or prohibit activities that may jeopardise the use and enjoyment of the 
Mall. Even so, this kind of ‘principle of legality’-style analysis, which was 
required in our view, was entirely absent from the majority judgments in Foley. 
On the other hand, it might be argued that Foley was decided before (what is 
now termed) the principle of legality began its contemporary reassertion and 
strengthening. That is certainly true. It was a trio of cases decided by the High 
Court between 1987 and 1992 when Sir Anthony Mason was Chief Justice that, 
arguably, heralded this common law (rights) renaissance. 71  But the (strong) 
interpretive presumption that legislation is not intended to interfere with common 
law rights and freedoms had long been part of Australian law.72 It is usually 
traced to the following passage in the judgment of O’Connor J in the High Court 
case of Potter v Minahan decided in 1908,73 where his Honour stated: 
It is in the last degree improbable that the legislature would overthrow 
fundamental principles, infringe rights, or depart from the general system of law, 
without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness; and to give any such 
effect to general words, simply because they have that meaning in their widest, or 
usual, or natural sense, would be to give them a meaning in which they were not 
really used.74 
And as noted, Isaacs J and Higgins J applied that principle in 1922 to the 
lawmaking power considered in Barry when the impugned by-law engaged the 
common law right to free use of the highway. But perhaps Foley was decided at 
the time when judges (in Australia at least) were on the cusp of extending the 
catalogue of rights beyond the traditional common law concerns of life, liberty 
and property to include civil and political rights such as freedom of speech. As 
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Lord Browne-Wilkinson observed extra-judicially in 1992, ‘the courts when 
construing statutory powers to interfere with personal freedoms, have not strictly 
applied the same strict criteria applied to penal or taxing statutes’.75 For a good 
part of the 20th century the principle of legality was applied by common law 
judges ‘in favour of a narrow vision of classical economic liberalism and against 
incursions from a modern, collectivist state’.76 
However, at the time Foley was decided there was very recent English 
authority that considered (and correctly applied in our view) the principle of 
legality in the context of secondary legislation. That was the 1983 case of 
Honey, 77  where the House of Lords examined a prison rule. A prisoner was 
involved in legal proceedings and sent a letter to his solicitors about the case. The 
prison governor read the letter and decided it should not be sent as it contained in 
his view material not relevant to the proceedings. He did so under prison rules 
that among other things provided that 
every letter or communication to or from a prisoner shall be read or examined by 
the governor or an officer deputed by him, and the governor may, at his discretion, 
stop any letter or communication on the ground that its contents are objectionable 
or that it is of inordinate length.78  
The prisoner then tried to send another letter to his solicitors containing 
material to begin an application for leave to commit the governor to prison for 
contempt of court for halting the first letter.79 The prison governor stopped that 
correspondence as well.80  
In Honey the rule-making power was conferred by section 47 of the Prison 
Act 1952 (UK), which allowed the Home Secretary to ‘make rules for the 
regulation and management of prisons … and for the classification, treatment, 
employment, discipline and control of persons required to be detained therein’.81 
The case seemed hopeless because even recent English cases had poured scorn 
on legal actions from ‘disgruntled prisoners’82 but the House of Lords approached 
the case as one of high principle.83 In order to determine whether the prison rules 
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authorised the actions of the prison governor, the House of Lords first had to 
ascertain the scope of this lawmaking power. Relevantly, Lord Wilberforce noted 
that the prisoner had a (common law) right ‘to have unimpeded access to a 
court’.84 To this Lord Bridge added ‘that a citizen’s right to unimpeded access  
to the courts can only be taken away by express enactment’.85 This led Lord 
Wilberforce to construe the rule-making power as 
a section concerned with the regulation and management of prisons and, in my 
opinion, is quite insufficient to authorise hindrance or interference with so basic a 
right. The regulations themselves must be interpreted accordingly, otherwise they 
would be ultra vires.86  
Lord Bridge similarly held that the ‘rule-making power is manifestly 
insufficient for such a purpose and it follows that the rules, to the extent that they 
would fetter a prisoner’s right of access to the courts, and in particular his right to 
institute proceedings in person, are ultra vires’.87 In contemporary parlance, once 
the prison rules were held to engage a fundamental right at common law, the 
House of Lords applied the principle of legality to section 47. This reasoning 
operated to interpretively protect the prisoner’s common law right to access the 
courts as the lawmaking power lacked the express words or necessary 
implication required to allow its interference by prison rules. The decision in 
Honey demonstrates the potency of the principle of legality in the context of 
secondary legislation.  
It is fascinating to note in this regard that something similar was emerging  
in the common law of South Africa when the apartheid regime still held  
power. It was outlined by Mureinik in his 1985 article ‘Fundamental Rights  
and Delegated Legislation’ and termed (by him) ‘the rule requiring specific 
authority’.88 Mureinik argued that basic rights could be overridden by secondary 
legislation (which he termed ‘inferior law’) only when that legislation was made 
under statutory authority that clearly authorised such override. He explained:  
legislative consent to the destruction of a fundamental right cannot be inferred 
from a general power: it can be inferred only from an empowering provision that 
envisages the destruction of that right. In other words, an inferior law that destroys 
a fundamental right is intra vires its empowering statute only if that statute, 
whether expressly or impliedly, specifically envisages the destruction of that 
fundamental right by an inferior law and, although this almost inevitably follows, 
acquiesces in that destruction. We might call this version of the doctrine that 
protects fundamental rights the rule requiring specific authority.89 
Unsurprisingly, Mureinik cited Honey as compelling (English) common  
law authority for the rule.90 He then traced its emergence and status in South  
African common law through the analysis of a series of cases decided between 
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1958 and 1983.91 The common feature of these cases, at least to our eyes, was the 
government’s use of general lawmaking powers to enact secondary legislation  
to deprive native (or black) South Africans of their fundamental rights. In each  
of the cases the rule requiring specific authority was endorsed as a matter  
of common law principle.92 Yet Mureinik was alarmed at how it was applied  
in Mandela v Minister of Prisons, 93  a case that involved interference with a 
prisoner’s fundamental right of access to their legal adviser by regulation. 94 
Another common feature of these cases is that they concerned prisoners and 
arguably show the germs of the normative element of the principle of legality 
recently identified by Lim. He argued that the principle was not triggered by 
fundamental rights but certain ‘vulnerable’ rights which were not sufficiently 
protected by the political process.95 
A useful illustration of Mureinik’s arguments was provided by an English 
case which also shows the evolution of the House of Lords reasoning from 
Honey to Ex parte Simms. That case was Ex parte Witham,96 where the Divisional 
Court declared invalid a rule which increased court filing fees and removed 
various powers for courts to reduce or waive fees for litigants in person on the 
ground of financial hardship. The Divisional Court held that the right of access to 
the courts was a fundamental one and that the power under which the relevant 
rule was made was not expressed with sufficient clarity to enable the making of a 
rule that significantly restricted that basic right. That part of the case sits 
comfortably with Honey but Laws J made two further important findings. First, 
the right of access to the courts was so important that its removal could never be 
authorised by implication. Secondly, it was near impossible to conceive ‘a form 
of words capable of making it plain beyond doubt … that the provision in 
question prevents [someone] from going to court’.97 This approach is reflected 
partly in the unmistakable clarity of words demanded by Ex parte Simms because 
that requirement essentially precludes the removal of basic rights by implication. 
The important refinement of Ex parte Simms was to accept the possibility that 
suitably clear words could authorise the removal or restriction of basic rights. 
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Lord Hoffmann did not explain what words might achieve that result but, unlike 
Laws J, he could at least conceive the possibility.98 
In this Part we have argued that when the ordinary or grammatical meaning 
of secondary legislation engages fundamental rights this brings (what is now 
termed) the principle of legality into interpretive play. If possible, it must be 
applied to lawmaking powers in statute. The upshot is that fundamental common 
law rights, freedoms and principles can only be infringed by secondary 
legislation if the empowering statute provides that power by express words or 
necessary implication. The stream cannot rise above its source in this regard. In 
the absence of this specific authority secondary legislation is either ultra vires the 
statutory lawmaking power or, if possible, must be read down to protect the 
common law right or freedom in play. That, as a matter of principle and logic, is 
the proper relationship between the principle of legality and secondary legislation 
in our view.  
The analysis above demonstrates that in Barry and Honey we have clear and 
high authority that this interpretive approach has long been recognised at 
common law in Australia and the United Kingdom. It may be difficult to 
reconcile the decisions of Lynch and Foley, or least their interpretive reasoning, 
with that approach. The majority judges in Lynch and Foley did not consider the 
applicability of the rights presumption though the impugned secondary 
legislation in both cases did engage fundamental common law rights. We did, 
however, suggest that one might reasonably make the following argument: that in 
the local government context it may be the case that it is necessarily implied from 
the nature and purposes for which lawmaking power is provided that at least 
some interference with common law rights is authorised to promote and maintain 
the convenience, comfort and safety of the area and its inhabitants. A more 
generous assessment is that the High Court decided Lynch and Foley before the 
renaissance of the principle of legality in contemporary Australian law. As 
concern about rights has risen, tolerance for their infringement has lessened, so 
Lynch and Foley are weakened if not overtaken by history. It is to the 
significance of this common law development in the construction of secondary 
legislation that we now turn.  
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IV   THE CONTEMPORARY RENOVATION OF THE PRINCIPLE 
OF LEGALITY AND SECONDARY LEGISLATION 
The contemporary renovation and strengthening of the principle of legality in 
Australian law is well documented.99 Chief Justice Gleeson, for example, said 
that ‘[i]n a free society, under the rule of law, it is an expression of a legal value, 
respected by the courts, and acknowledged by the courts to be respected by 
Parliament’.100 And French CJ, writing extra-judicially, has said ‘the interpretive 
rule can be regarded as “constitutional” in character even if the rights and 
freedoms that it protects are not’.101 The authoritative contemporary statement as 
to the nature and scope of the principle in Australian law comes from the joint 
judgment of Mason CJ, Brennan, Gaudron and McHugh JJ in Coco v The Queen 
(‘Coco’): 
The insistence on express authorization of an abrogation or curtailment of a 
fundamental right, freedom or immunity must be understood as a requirement for 
some manifestation or indication that the legislature has not only directed its 
attention to the question of the abrogation or curtailment of such basic rights, 
freedoms or immunities but has also determined upon abrogation or curtailment of 
them. The courts should not impute to the legislature an intention to interfere with 
fundamental rights. Such an intention must be clearly manifested by unmistakable 
and unambiguous language. General words will rarely be sufficient for that 
purpose if they do not specifically deal with the question because, in the context in 
which they appear, they will often be ambiguous on the aspect of interference with 
fundamental rights.102 
But its most famous exposition, as noted, comes from the judgment of Lord 
Hoffman in Ex parte Simms. That case involved a successful challenge to prison 
rules that infringed the common law right to freedom of expression of the 
relevant prisoners. The principle of legality was applied to the same lawmaking 
power – section 47 of the Prison Act 1952 (UK) – considered in Honey and with 
the same result. Relevantly, Lord Hoffman concluded: 
What this case decides is that the principle of legality applies to subordinate 
legislation as much as to Acts of Parliament. Prison regulations expressed in 
general language are also presumed to be subject to fundamental human rights. 
The presumption enables them to be valid. But, it also means that properly 
construed, they do not authorise a blanket restriction which would curtail not 
merely the prisoner’s right of free expression, but its use in a way which could 
provide him with access to justice.103 
                                                 
99  See, eg, Lacey v A-G (Qld) (2011) 242 CLR 573; X7 v Australian Crime Commission (2013) 248 CLR 
92; Lee v New South Wales Crime Commission (2013) 251 CLR 196; Dan Meagher, ‘The Common Law 
Principle of Legality in the Age of Rights’ (2011) 35 Melbourne University Law Review 449; Lim, above 
n 95; Dan Meagher, ‘The Principle of Legality as Clear Statement Rule: Significance and Problems’ 
(2014) 36 Sydney Law Review 413. 
100  Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562, 577 [20]. 
101  Chief Justice Robert French, ‘Protecting Human Rights without a Bill of Rights’ (2010) 43 John 
Marshall Law Review 769, 788. 
102  (1994) 179 CLR 427, 437 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Gaudron and McHugh JJ) (citations omitted), 446 (Deane 
and Dawson JJ). 
103  Ex parte Simms [2000] 2 AC 115, 132. 
468 UNSW Law Journal Volume 39(2) 
This approach to the construction of empowering statutes when common law 
rights and freedoms are in play was outlined by the House of Lords in the earlier, 
important, decisions of R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex parte 
Leech (‘Ex parte Leech’)104 and R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; 
Ex parte Pierson (‘Ex parte Pierson’). 105  The former case, again, concerned 
whether prison rules that infringed a prisoner’s common law rights to legal 
professional privilege and access to the courts were authorised by section 47 of 
the Prison Act 1952 (UK). The impugned prison rule provided the governor with 
an unrestricted power to read and examine prisoner letters on the ground that its 
contents are objectionable or of inordinate length.106 Steyn LJ, for the Court, held 
that section 47(1) … by necessary implication authorises some screening of 
correspondence passing between a prisoner and a solicitor. The authorised 
intrusion must, however, be the minimum necessary to ensure that the 
correspondence is in truth bona fide legal correspondence.107  
The interpretive issue was the extent to which section 47 authorised by 
necessary implication prison rules to interfere with the common law rights and 
freedoms of the prisoners in order to achieve their purpose. In this regard, the 
Court held that the rule went considerably beyond what was necessary to ensure 
that letters between a prisoner and their lawyer were bona fide legal 
correspondence. 108  It found no ‘demonstrable need’ for such an unrestricted 
power and held the rule ultra vires the lawmaking power as a consequence.109 In 
doing so, a form of balancing and justification analysis was undertaken by Steyn 
LJ. For example, the State had to justify why such a broad prison rule was 
necessary to achieve the legitimate statutory objective of ensuring the letters of 
prisoners were bona fide legal correspondence.110 In addition, the State had to 
establish that the rule did so with the ‘minimum necessary’ interference with the 
common law rights of the prisoners.111 It failed on both counts.  
In Ex parte Pierson – a case decided just prior to Ex parte Simms – the House 
of Lords confirmed once more the proper relationship between the principle of 
legality and secondary legislation. Lord Browne-Wilkinson traced the relevant 
line of authorities (including Honey and Ex parte Leech) and said they 
established the following proposition: 
A power conferred by Parliament in general terms is not to be taken to authorise 
the doing of acts by the donee of the power which adversely affect the legal rights 
of the citizen or the basic principles on which the law of the United Kingdom is 
based unless the statute conferring the power makes it clear that such was the 
intention of Parliament.112 
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In Australia there is also recent authority for the proposition that the principle 
of legality is applied to primary and secondary legislation where interpretively 
possible.113 In City of Adelaide, for example, French CJ noted that the principle 
‘is of long standing and has been restated over many years. It can be taken to be a 
presumption of which those who draft legislation, regulations and by-laws are 
aware’.114 Justice Heydon also made the following observation: 
The principle of legality can apply both to parliamentary legislation creating a 
power to make delegated legislation, and to the delegated legislation itself. The 
consequence of applying the principle of legality to a power in parliamentary 
legislation to make delegated legislation will tend to be a relatively narrow 
construction of that power.115 
Interestingly this view – that a relatively narrow construction of the 
lawmaking power is the consequence of applying the principle of legality – may 
be at odds with the approach (and judgment) of Dixon CJ in Lynch. But, as noted, 
no ‘principle of legality’-style analysis was undertaken in Lynch even though the 
impugned ordinance, arguably, engaged a fundamental common law right. In any 
event, this line of United Kingdom cases and the recent statements of the High 
Court noted above confirm, in our view, the proper relationship between the 
principle of legality and secondary legislation: common law rights and freedoms 
can only be infringed by secondary legislation if the empowering statute provides 
that power by express words or necessary implication. Otherwise the secondary 
legislation must be read down to protect the common law right or freedom in 
play or it will be ultra vires the lawmaking power if that is not interpretively 
possible. We now turn to consider two recent Australian cases where it was 
argued that the common law right to freedom of speech was impermissibly 
infringed by secondary legislation. We do so to consider how appellate courts in 
Australia have articulated the relationship between the principle of legality and 
secondary legislation and the interpretive approach applied as a consequence.  
 
V   THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY AND SECONDARY 
LEGISLATION: RECENT AUSTRALIAN CASES 
A   Evans v New South Wales 
Evans v New South Wales (‘Evans’)116 arose from World Youth Day, an event 
held in Sydney in July 2008 involving hundreds of thousands of young Catholic 
pilgrims from around the world. The applicants were protesters who opposed 
Catholic Church doctrine on abortion, contraception and sexuality and wished to 
directly communicate these views to the World Youth Day pilgrims. The 
applicants were concerned that their planned activities would be prevented by the 
World Youth Day Act 2006 (NSW) (‘the Act’) and the World Youth Day 
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Regulation 2008 (NSW) (‘the Regulation’). To this end, the applicants sought 
declarations in the Full Court of the Federal Court that section 46(3) of the Act 
and clauses 4 and 7 of the Regulation were invalid. 
Justices French, Branson and Stone rejected the challenge to section 46(3) of 
the Act. But relevantly for present purposes, they held clause 7(1)(b) of the 
Regulation  
invalid to the extent to which it applies to conduct which ‘causes annoyance’ to 
participants in World Youth Day events. This provision affects freedom of speech 
in a way that is not supported by the statutory power conferred by section 58 of 
the Act.117  
Section 58 provided the governor with a wide regulation-making power. The 
relevant parts were expressed as follows:  
(1) The Governor may make regulations, not inconsistent with this Act, for or 
with respect to any matter that by this Act is required or permitted to be 
prescribed or that is necessary or convenient to be prescribed for carrying out 
or giving effect to this Act. 
(2) In particular, regulations may be made for or with respect to the following: 
(a) the fees and charges that may be imposed for the purposes of this Act, 
(b) regulating the use by the public of, and the conduct of the public on, 
World Youth Day venues and facilities… 
Clause 7 of the Regulation was made pursuant to section 58 and provided: 
(1) An authorized person may direct a person within a World Youth Day 
declared area to cease engaging in conduct that: 
(a) is a risk to the safety of the person or others, or 
(b) causes annoyance or inconvenience to participants in a World Youth 
Day event, or 
(c) obstructs a World Youth Day event. 
(2) A person must not, without reasonable excuse, fail to comply with a 
direction given to the person under subclause (1). 
Maximum penalty: 50 penalty units. 
The Court noted that  
[u]nconstrained by any limiting principle of construction, the power conferred by s 
58(2)(b), taken in isolation, could be used to make a regulation enjoining silence 
at World Youth Day venues and facilities or mandating prayer. However there are 
constraints.118  
But once it was recognised that section 58 ‘may encompass acts and some or 
all forms of speech and communication’119 it brought the (limiting) principle of 
legality into play. Importantly, the Court observed that 
the legislature, through the expert parliamentary counsel who draft legislation, 
may be taken to be aware of the principle of construction in Potter and later 
authorities such as Bropho and Coco and the need for clear words to be used 
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before long established (if not ‘fundamental’) rights and freedoms are taken 
away.120  
Moreover, ‘[i]n Australia, the exercise of legislative power, whether primary 
or delegated, takes place, as it does in England, in the constitutional setting of “a 
liberal democracy founded on the traditions and principles of the common 
law”’.121 The application of the principle of legality to section 58 operated to limit 
the ‘conduct’ that could be validly enjoined by regulation. This led the Court to 
conclude: 
The conduct regulated by cl 7(1)(b) so far as it relates to ‘annoyance’ may extend 
to expressions of opinion which neither disrupt nor interfere with the freedoms of 
others, nor are objectively offensive in the sense traditionally used in State 
criminal statutes. Breach of this provision as drafted affects freedom of speech in a 
way that, in our opinion, is not supported by the statutory power conferred by s 58 
properly construed. Moreover there is no intelligible boundary within which the 
‘causes annoyance’ limb of [cl 7] can be read down to save it as a valid expression 
of the regulating power.122  
The interpretive approach in Evans is, arguably, consistent with Barry, 
Honey and, most relevantly, Ex parte Simms, the latter having been cited with 
approval by the Court.123 There was no statutory mandate in section 58(2) through 
express words or necessary implication to authorise the infringement of the 
applicants’ common law right to freedom of speech – at least to this extent – by 
regulation. Nevertheless the Court held that prohibiting conduct which caused 
‘inconvenience’ to World Youth Day participants was authorised by section 
58(2): ‘Such inconvenience may arise, for example, where protestors by their 
locations or actions hinder or obstruct the movement of participants or are so 
loud in their protest as to impair communications between groups of participants 
and officials’.124 
This clearly contemplated that at least some interference with the common 
law free speech rights of the protestors was permissible by regulation. That is, to 
the extent that clause 7(1)(b) sought to regulate a protest (a quintessential form of 
free speech) when it caused inconvenience (in the manner defined) to World 
Youth Day participants, it was valid. In doing so, the Court appeared to 
undertake some form of balancing analysis when it determined that only the 
‘annoyance’ component of clause 7(1)(b) was beyond power. It did not do so 
expressly but in our view the Court must have done so based on the following 
assumption: the very nature of the lawmaking power conferred by section 58(2) 
in the context of organising and hosting World Youth Day authorised by 
necessary implication at least some interference with the common law free 
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speech rights of the protestors. That is, to facilitate the regulation of a very large 
series of public events on the streets of Sydney necessarily implied that some 
interference with the common law rights and freedoms of those wishing to attend 
and protest was authorised. But the extent of that interference had to be 
determined, for section 58 did not make this clear. In this way, the broad and 
general wording of the lawmaking power left interpretive scope for the protection 
of the common law free speech rights of the protestors to the extent that it was 
compatible with what the statute was trying to achieve. If so, the interpretive 
approach in Evans is consistent with the proper relationship between the 
principle of legality and secondary legislation as detailed in Parts II and III. 
 
B   Attorney-General (SA) v Adelaide City Corporation 
City of Adelaide involved two brothers (Caleb and Samuel Corneloup) who 
were preaching about their religious beliefs and associated political convictions 
on the streets of Adelaide without a permit.125 The core of the case concerned the 
validity of local council by-laws that prohibited any person from undertaking the 
following activities on a road without a permit: 
 ‘preach, canvass, harangue, tout for business or conduct any survey or 
opinion poll’;126 and 
 ‘give out or distribute to any bystander or passer-by any handbill, book, 
notice, or other printed matter’.127  
The Council considered that the preaching activities of the Corneloup 
brothers, which were undertaken without a permit, violated these by-laws. The 
brothers, on the other hand, argued that the by-laws were ultra vires the 
lawmaking power which authorised local councils to make by-laws ‘generally for 
the good rule and government of the area, and for the convenience, comfort and 
safety of its inhabitants’.128 It was this broad and common species of local council 
lawmaking authority – termed the ‘convenience power’129 by Hayne J – that was 
considered also in Lynch and Foley.  
Importantly, Hayne J rejected the argument that past authority (including 
Barry and Lynch) required that the convenience power must be construed 
narrowly:  
Isaacs J and Higgins J each held that the express power to make a by-law 
‘regulating’ processions did not authorise making a by-law that prohibited 
processions unless consent was given … That being so, it is unsurprising that each 
concluded that the power to make by-laws ‘[g]enerally for maintaining the good 
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rule and government of the municipality’ could not support the by-law in 
question.130 
The interpretive approach of the High Court in Barry (and of Isaacs J in 
particular) to the relevant convenience power was said to provide ‘no support  
for a general proposition that a general conferral of by-law making power must 
be construed narrowly when the Act specifically lists other purposes for which  
by-laws may be made’.131 Then followed a careful analysis of Lynch and other 
relevant convenience power cases 132  which led Hayne J (Bell J agreeing) to 
conclude: 
These cases … demonstrate the need to read a general provision like the 
convenience power in its statutory context. They demonstrate that particular 
aspects of statutory context may show that some applications of the provision 
otherwise available must yield to competing contextual indications (as was the 
case in Barry).133  
The ‘importance of the statutory setting in construing a provision of this 
kind’ was emphasised also in the judgment of Crennan and Kiefel JJ.134 These 
judges were clearly correct to note the centrality (indeed primacy) of context to 
the proper construction of statutory provisions, including convenience powers 
expressed in broad and general terms. This much is clear from the High Court’s 
authoritative contemporary statement on statutory interpretation in Project Blue 
Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (‘Project Blue Sky’):  
[T]he duty of a court is to give the words of a statutory provision the meaning that 
the legislature is taken to have intended them to have. Ordinarily, that meaning 
(the legal meaning) will correspond with the grammatical meaning of the 
provision. But not always. The context of the words, the consequences of a literal 
or grammatical construction, the purpose of the statute or the canons of 
construction may require the words of a legislative provision to be read in a way 
that does not correspond with the literal or grammatical meaning.135 
There are, however, at least three points to be made here. First, Hayne J was 
correct to distinguish the approach of Isaacs J and Higgins J in Barry regarding 
the regulation/prohibition issue from the relevant legislative context in City of 
Adelaide. But as noted, in addition both judges found that the by-law infringed 
the common law right to free use of the highway. Consequently, (what is now 
termed) the principle of legality came into play in Barry. And in the absence of 
express words or necessary implication in the lawmaking (convenience) power, 
that common law right could not be infringed by regulation. Indeed this – to 
ascertain the proper scope of the lawmaking authority conferred by the relevant 
convenience power – was the logically prior interpretive issue. And the finding 
of Isaacs J and Higgins J on this issue alone would have invalidated a by-law that 
infringed the common law right to free use of the highway whether or not 
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prohibiting processions without council consent was intra vires that power. This 
makes the silence of Hayne J (and Bell J and Crennan and Kiefel JJ) on this 
logically prior interpretive issue in City of Adelaide puzzling. If the ordinary and 
grammatical meaning of the impugned by-laws in City of Adelaide engaged a 
common law right or freedom of the Corneloup brothers – and for reasons 
discussed shortly (and in their own judgments) they clearly did – then this 
required the principle of legality to be applied to the construction of the relevant 
convenience power if interpretively possible. And this is so even if Hayne J was 
correct (and we think he was) to observe (and reject) the argument that these 
prior authorities require the narrow construction of convenience powers 
irrespective of the relevant statutory context. We do not suggest that the ultimate 
construction of the lawmaking power given by Hayne J, Bell J and Crennan and 
Kiefel JJ – and the concomitant finding of the by-law’s validity – was, 
necessarily, in error. For as noted in regards to the similar lawmaking power and 
context in Foley, there is a strong argument that it is necessarily implied from the 
nature and purpose of this kind of local government lawmaking power that at 
least some interference with common law rights (such as speech, association and 
liberty) is authorised to ensure ‘the convenience, comfort and safety of its 
inhabitants’. 
Secondly, the above statement from Project Blue Sky makes clear that 
statutory context may include ‘the canons of construction’. Indeed the Court cited 
the principle of legality as applied in Coco as authority for that point.136 In other 
words, if the City of Adelaide by-laws engaged a common law right or freedom 
then the principle of legality forms a necessary and important part of the relevant 
context in which they and the convenience power must be construed. The final 
(and related) point is that the Court, unanimously, found that the by-laws 
effectively burdened freedom of communication about government or political 
matters. The Justices did so in the course of holding that the by-laws did not 
offend the implied constitutional freedom of political communication (‘the 
implied freedom’). We will consider this important issue in more detail below. 
But the relevant point for present purposes is that – in so finding – the by-laws 
must also have engaged the common law right to freedom of speech of the 
Corneloup brothers. That, necessarily, followed as Heydon J observed: ‘The 
common law right of free speech which the principle of legality protects is 
significantly wider, incidentally, than the constitutional limitation on the power 
to enact laws burdening communications on government and political matters’.137 
Clearly enough the common law to freedom of speech, prima facie, includes 
‘preaching about the Christian religion in the streets of Adelaide’.138 And so too a 
by-law that ‘prohibit[s] persons preaching on any road and distributing printed 
matter on any road to any bystander or passer-by without permission’139 interferes 
with that right. Consequently, it required the principle of legality to be applied to 
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the construction of the relevant convenience power if interpretively possible. Yet 
only two members of the Court – French CJ and Heydon J (the latter in dissent) – 
did so. One possible explanation for this omission in the judgments of Hayne J, 
Crennan and Kiefel JJ and Bell J is the (unarticulated) view that the disposal of 
the implied freedom issue necessarily disposes of the common law (fundamental 
rights) issue as well; or that the characterisation issue – as to whether or not the 
by-laws were a ‘reasonable’ exercise of the lawmaking power – necessarily 
involved assessing the impact on fundamental rights. Neither view is sound, 
however, as we will explain below. Moreover, as noted, it is not sufficient or 
decisive that ‘the words of the convenience power are well able to support a by-
law governing whether and when there may be activities on a road which may 
diminish the convenience of using the road’.140 That characterisation proposition 
is clearly correct. But the applicability of the principle of legality was a separate 
and logically prior interpretive issue in City of Adelaide that required 
consideration and clarification before the process of characterising whether or not 
the by-law was intra vires the convenience power. 
To add to this already complex interpretive mix, French CJ and Heydon J 
both applied the principle of legality in City of Adelaide but came to opposite 
conclusions as to the validity of the by-laws. Chief Justice French noted that 
‘[s]tatutes are construed, where constructional choices are open, so that they do 
not encroach upon fundamental rights and freedoms at common law’.141 In this 
regard his Honour said the by-law was intra vires the convenience power if used 
to control only the mode or circumstances of the proposed preaching and 
haranguing but not its content. That is, the validity of the by-laws as applied 
required content neutrality:142  
the subject matter of By-law No 4 and the discretion which it created to grant 
permissions to engage in the conduct which it otherwise proscribed, had to fall 
within the scope of matters of municipal concern or ‘accepted notions of local 
government’. Control of the expression of religious or political opinions per se is 
not within that subject matter. According to the circumstances, control sub modo 
may be within it. By-law No 4, so understood, involved the least interference with 
freedom of expression that its language could bear.143 
This construction of the by-laws – and the scope of the lawmaking power of 
its empowering statute – involved a similar kind of balancing process to that 
undertaken by the Federal Court in Evans (which included French J, in its 
judgment). The lawmaking power did not expressly authorise interference with 
common law rights and freedoms as Heydon J noted in dissent.144 In our view, 
then, French CJ must have reached this construction on the assumption that the 
very nature of the convenience power in this local government authorised by 
necessary implication at least some interference with the common law free 
speech rights of persons (like the Corneloup brothers) on the streets of Adelaide. 
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In other words, the lawmaking power authorised the least interference with 
freedom of expression necessary to ensure the convenience, comfort and safety 
of the local inhabitants. In this way the ‘constructional choice’ made by French 
CJ in City of Adelaide was, arguably, in accordance with Coco if the lawmaking 
power met or displaced the principle of legality by necessary implication.  
Justice Heydon, in his dissenting judgment, outlined the proper relationship 
between the principle of legality and secondary legislation: common law rights 
and freedoms can only be infringed by secondary legislation if the empowering 
statute provides that power by express words or necessary implication.145 In this 
regard, he noted that ‘the crucial issue [was] the impact of the principle of 
legality on the width of the [convenience] powers to make delegated 
legislation’.146 Justice Heydon, then, examined the statutory text to determine 
whether Parliament had considered and consciously decided to confer a 
lawmaking power which authorised the abrogation of curtailment of common law 
rights and freedoms. It led him to conclude: 
it cannot be inferred from the form of s 667(1)(9)(XVI) that the legislature 
appreciated the question of free speech, or that the legislature intended s 
667(1)(9)(XVI) to permit by-laws of the kind challenged in this appeal, or that, in 
Lord Hoffmann’s words, the legislature ‘squarely confront[ed] what it [was] doing 
and accept[ed] the political cost’. … [I]t is clear that they are too general, 
ambiguous and uncertain to grant a power to make by-laws having the adverse 
effect on free speech of the challenged clauses.147 
The upshot is that Heydon J disagreed with French CJ as to how the principle 
of legality was to be applied but not with the content of the principle itself or its 
relationship to the proper scope of secondary lawmaking powers. Relevantly, as 
the empowering statute in City of Adelaide did not expressly authorise 
interference with common law rights and freedoms, their disagreement was about 
whether such a power was conferred on local councils by necessary implication. 
So considered we would argue that the approach of French CJ and Heydon J in 
City of Adelaide and the Federal Court in Evans confirm the proper relationship 
between the principle of legality and secondary legislation.  
We turn now to consider two recent Federal Court cases where it was argued 
that the relevant secondary legislation was invalid for infringing the implied 
freedom. The constitutional challenges failed in both cases. But what is 
interesting for present purposes is that consideration of the principle of legality 
did not feature in the reasoning of either decision. We will suggest that the 
interpretive approach taken in both cases was in error for two reasons. For if, as 
in these instances, the impugned secondary legislation engages the implied 
freedom then, by definition, so too does it engage the common law right to 
freedom of speech. The latter is considerably wider than the former as Heydon J 
noted in City of Adelaide. This brings the principle of legality into play. And, as 
an important aspect in the construction of the secondary legislation, the High 
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Court has made clear that it must first be considered (and applied if interpretively 
possible) before moving to the constitutional (implied freedom) issue. The 
distinction is an important one, as the disposal of the implied freedom issue does 
not, necessarily, do likewise for the common law (freedom of speech) issue.  
 
VI   THE IMPLIED CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOM OF 
POLITICAL COMMUNICATION, THE PRINCIPLE OF 
LEGALITY AND SECONDARY LEGISLATION 
We noted above that in City of Adelaide, Hayne J, Crennan and Kiefel JJ,  
and Bell J assessed the compatibility of the impugned by-laws with the  
implied freedom but did not consider the principle of legality. This was curious 
in our view as these judges accepted that the impugned secondary legislation  
did effectively burden political speech. If so, then the relevant by-laws 
necessarily engaged the common law right to freedom of speech and should have 
bought the principle of legality into interpretive play. The same pattern (and 
absence) of reasoning occurred in the recent Federal Court cases of O’Flaherty v 
City of Sydney Council (‘O’Flaherty’)148 and Muldoon v Melbourne City Council 
(‘Muldoon’).149  These cases arose out of the ‘Occupy Movement’ protests in 
Sydney and Melbourne respectively.  
In O’Flaherty, the impugned laws were local government notices that 
prohibited camping or staying overnight in a public place being Martin Place in 
the Sydney CBD. The empowering statute made it an offence for a person to fail 
to comply with the terms of a notice erected by the City of Sydney.150 It also 
provided that the terms of any such notice may relate to any one or more of the 
following: ‘the payment of a fee for entry to or the use of the place’; ‘the taking 
of a vehicle into the place; the driving, parking or use of a vehicle in the place’; 
‘the taking of an animal or thing into the place’; ‘the use of any animal or thing 
in the place’; ‘the doing of any thing in the place’; and ‘the use of the place or 
any part of the place’.151 
Similarly, the most important of the impugned local laws in Muldoon 
provided that no person without a permit must ‘camp in or on any public place in 
a vehicle, tent, caravan or any type of temporary or provisional form of 
accommodation’.152 This secondary legislation – the Activities Local Law 2009 
(‘Local Law’) – was made pursuant to the convenience power provided to the 
Melbourne City Council by the Local Government Act 1989 (Vic): 
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A Council may make local laws for or with respect to any act, matter or thing in 
respect of which the Council has a function or power under this or any other 
Act.153 
The relevant public places to which the Local Law applied were the Treasury 
and Flagstaff Gardens and Gordon Reserve on the fringes of the Melbourne 
CBD.154 The Local Law further provided that its proscriptions could be enforced 
by oral or written directions from an authorised officer or the serving of a notice 
to comply.155  
The applicants in O’Flaherty and Muldoon were both involved in protests 
that involved extended occupation of these public places. They erected tents, 
signs and facilities (including a kitchen and areas for first aid and community 
education) and would camp at night during the occupation. The primary mode of 
these ‘Occupy Movement’ protests was ‘to maintain a continuous presence in 
public places … [which] allowed the protesters to continually convey the 
political message to the public’.156 Importantly, as North J observed in Muldoon, 
‘[t]he occupation of public space was part of the political message because it 
allowed the protesters to enact and demonstrate the alternative political and 
governmental structures it sought to promote for Australia’.157 
Interestingly, the incompatibility or otherwise of the secondary legislation 
and the empowering statutes with the implied freedom was the exclusive focus of 
the analysis undertaken by Katzmann J in O’Flaherty and dominated the 
reasoning of North J in Muldoon as well. The characterisation analysis that was 
central to the judgments of Hayne J and Crennan and Kiefel JJ in particular in 
City of Adelaide and Dixon CJ in Lynch was absent in both cases. In Muldoon, 
for example, North J did not first seek to ascertain the proper scope of the 
lawmaking authority conferred on the Melbourne City Council by the 
convenience power and whether the impugned local laws were intra vires that 
power. Instead he went straight to the construction of the local laws pursuant to 
which the notices to comply were issued.158 In O’Flaherty, Katzmann J did not 
consider whether the local government notices were ultra vires the empowering 
statute before turning to the constitutional issue. On the interpretive issue, both 
Justices may have assumed that the breadth of the lawmaking provisions were 
clearly sufficient to sustain the validity of the relevant secondary legislation. If 
so, we agree that as a characterisation matter the local laws in Muldoon and the 
notices in O’Flaherty were within power. But closer attention to the proper 
construction of the empowering statutes (before turning to the implied freedom) 
may have alerted both Justices to the possibility of the otherwise open-ended 
statutory language being limited in both contexts once the common law right to 
free (political) speech was in legislative play.  
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In any event, as was the case with City of Adelaide, the constitutional 
analysis undertaken in O’Flaherty and Muldoon was perfectly sound in our  
view. The continuous act of occupation in these public places was itself  
political communication protected by the Constitution as both Katzmann J and 
North J noted.159 And in both cases, this political communication was effectively 
burdened by the prohibitions and restrictions on that occupation contained in the 
secondary legislation.160 But that burden was indirect or incidental to the pursuit 
of other legitimate ends such as ‘maintaining public health, safety and amenity  
in a high use public area, and preserving the ability of all members of the  
public to use the area’.161 And those prohibitions and restrictions were reasonably 
appropriate and adapted to serving those ends in manner that was compatible 
with the Australian constitutional system of representative and responsible 
government.162 
However the disposal of the implied freedom issue is not, necessarily, 
sufficient to answer the common law (fundamental rights) issue. Indeed to 
consider the former before the latter is contrary to the High Court’s routine 
warning that the first step in constitutional cases (including those where the 
implied freedom is argued) is to properly construe the impugned legislation.163 
And as was demonstrated by the Federal Court in Evans and the High Court in 
Coleman v Power, the construction of a broadly framed statute (such as the 
convenience power in Muldoon) that burdens free (political) speech brings the 
principle of legality into play. The important point is that a successful common 
law rights argument does not turn upon the success or otherwise of the 
constitutional (implied freedom) issue. Indeed, the focus of the relevant analysis 
is quite different depending on which issue is being judicially considered. As 
Hayne J explained in a widely-cited passage from APLA Ltd v Legal Services 
Commissioner (NSW): 
The implied freedom of political communication is a limitation on legislative 
power; it is not an individual right. It follows that, in deciding whether the 
freedom has been infringed, the central question is what the impugned law does, 
not how an individual might want to construct a particular communication …164 
But the common law right to freedom of speech is an individual right so the 
judicial concern is to protect the relevant instance of (political) speech from 
legislative encroachment if interpretively possible. Though clearly related, they 
are separate issues with different core inquiries. It demonstrates why courts must 
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consider the common law and constitutional issues in that order whenever 
impugned (secondary) legislation engages freedom of (political) speech. In this 
regard it may not be entirely accurate to claim, as North J did in Muldoon, that 
‘[t]he distinction between the implied freedom of political communication and a 
personal right to free communication is largely a theoretical distinction’.165 
In O’Flaherty and Muldoon, the Federal Court upheld the validity of 
secondary legislation that either prohibited or limited the continuous occupation 
of public places (including camping overnight) without local council consent. As 
noted, the impugned local laws were authorised by a broadly framed notice 
power in the former and a local government convenience power in the latter. It 
was recognised that the local laws in both cases effectively burdened political 
communication. If so, then the common law right to freedom of (political) speech 
is necessarily engaged and the principle of legality comes into play. However, in 
neither case was this logically prior issue addressed. If this analysis was 
undertaken, it may have been the case that the empowering statutes, though 
lacking express authorisation for the infringement of common law rights and 
freedoms, did provide such a power by necessary implication. That is, one might 
reasonably argue that the convenience powers in O’Flaherty and Muldoon 
necessarily implied the power to restrict the common law rights to speech and 
liberty to the extent necessary to preserve the public health, safety and amenity of 
those public places.  
In any event, it was certainly the case that the terms of the impugned local 
laws in O’Flaherty and Muldoon were broad enough to proscribe the continuous 
occupation (as political protest). But it is that very breadth, generality and non-
specificity that can be problematic from a regulatory perspective when the 
principle of legality is in play. 
 
VII   THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY AND SECONDARY 
LEGISLATION: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES AND FUTURE 
DEVELOPMENT 
In our introduction we attributed the modern form of the principle of legality 
to Ex parte Simms. While the principle of legality clearly has much older 
lineage,166  Ex parte Simms marked a watershed on several counts. The most 
notable was Lord Hoffmann’s suggestion that Parliament must squarely confront 
the issues whenever it sought to legislate to remove or narrow basic rights.167 We 
also noted earlier in this article that the suggestion of Lord Hoffmann arguably 
provides a more measured approach than the initial one offered by Laws J, who 
accepted that Parliaments could legislate to remove or narrow fundamental  
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rights but suggested that in some cases the rights to which this possibility  
applied could be an illusion.168 Lord Hoffmann’s conception of the principle of 
legality therefore incorporates an important concession: legislation may remove 
or restrict fundamental rights and freedoms at common law if it is expressed  
in suitably clear terms. The judicial acceptance of that possibility is an  
orthodox expression of the traditional relationship between the courts and 
Parliament – Parliament enacts, courts interpret.169 Chief Justice Gleeson was 
clearly influenced by similar considerations when he explained that the principle 
of legality is 
not merely a common sense guide to what a Parliament in a liberal democracy is 
likely to have intended; it is a working hypothesis, the existence of which is 
known both to Parliament and the courts, upon which statutory language will be 
interpreted. The hypothesis is an aspect of the rule of law.170 
Many aspects of the rule of law express principles governing the relationship 
between the courts and Parliament.171 The principle of legality also expresses an 
aspect of that relationship and was rightly identified within that broader 
arrangement by Gleeson CJ. But in our view, distinct issues arise when the 
principle of legality may be called upon to determine the validity of secondary 
legislation. The most obvious is Lord Hoffmann’s requirement that Parliament 
must squarely confront problems ‘and accept the political cost’ associated with 
removing or restricting basic rights by enacting the relevant legislation in 
unmistakably clear terms.172 Although that requirement was explained in a case 
involving secondary legislation, it sits uneasily with secondary legislation. That 
is because Parliament can only squarely confront and accept clear political 
responsibility for what it directly considers and enacts. The fragmented processes 
to make and review secondary legislation do not provide a clear point at which 
Parliament must adhere to the stringent requirements of Lord Hoffmann. 
Secondary legislation is typically devised by one part of government, perhaps a 
government department or an autonomous agency, approved by Cabinet, then 
formally given effect by the Executive Council and finally placed before 
Parliament but only after it has been made. Responsibility within such lengthy 
processes is inevitably diffuse.  
In Ahmed v Her Majesty’s Treasury (‘Ahmed’), 173  which was decided a 
decade after Ex parte Simms, Lord Phillips accepted that the approach of Lord 
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Hoffmann made clear ‘that the principle of legality applied as much to 
subordinate legislation as to Acts of Parliament’.174 The secondary legislation in 
issue in Ahmed was an Order in Council that was made under the United Nations 
Act 1946 (UK) and designed to give effect to a resolution of the UN Security 
Council that was designed to prevent the financing of terrorist activities.175 The 
UK government used the 1946 Act to make Orders to give effect to the Security 
Council resolutions. Those Orders operated to freeze the assets and bank 
accounts of the people or organisations to which they applied. The Orders 
imposed wide-ranging and very stringent prohibitions on designated people, 
which precluded designated people from drawing on or dealing with their own 
assets, bank accounts or any sort of financial resource. The key question before 
the Supreme Court was whether a statutory power to make instruments 
‘necessary or expedient’176 to enable decisions of the UN Security Council to be 
given effect could support an instrument that had such drastic effect on the 
property and other rights of a person who ‘is or may be’ involved in supporting 
terrorism.177 
The Supreme Court set aside the Order on the basis that it adopted a test of 
‘reasonable suspicion’ that was not included in the UN Security Council 
resolution the Order purported to give effect, so it was outside what was 
‘necessary or expedient’ to comply with the resolution.178 That finding could 
easily have been made as one of ultra vires but the Supreme Court also gave 
important signals about the principle of legality and secondary legislation. It was 
equally important that these signals were not uniform. These differences arose 
about the underlying question in Ahmed – what is the proper scope of delegated 
legislation? That question was central to Ahmed because the Order froze the 
assets of designated people and stripped their rights to question that designation. 
Importantly, Orders could be made simply on the basis of suspicion. The parties 
opposing the Order argued that such drastic measures should only take the form 
of statute rather than secondary legislation. The important related argument they 
made for our purposes was that the principle of legality operated to preclude such 
drastic measures being taken in the form of secondary legislation. Lord Phillips 
held that there was no clear authority ‘supporting the proposition that the 
principle of legality raises a general presumption against Parliament delegating to 
the executive the power to make regulations that call for legislative design’.179 
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According to this view, there are not necessarily ‘no-go’ areas for secondary 
legislation. If there are such boundaries, Lord Phillips suggests that they  
are not to be policed by the courts, at least not through the guise of the  
principle of legality.180 It follows that secondary legislation can remove or narrow 
fundamental rights so long as this occurs under a suitably expressed power to do 
so. But Lord Phillips made clear that the benchmark for such a power remained 
the stringent level of clarity of Ex parte Simms. He explained: 
a statutory provision which delegates to the executive the power to make 
regulations should be strictly construed and that, where the power is conferred in 
general terms, it may be necessary to imply restrictions in its scope in order to 
avoid interference with individual rights that is not proportionate to the object of 
the primary legislation.181 
In reaching the same broad conclusion, Lord Brown identified the problem 
with invoking the principle of legality in the case at hand, namely that ‘almost 
any’ Order made under the statute in question was ‘likely to interfere with 
somebody’s fundamental rights’.182 If so, the core of the statute assumed that the 
principle of legality could not preclude secondary legislation which removed or 
infringed basic rights. That may explain why Lord Brown conceded that 
‘[o]bviously, the Simms principle cannot operate to emasculate the [rule-making] 
power entirely’. 183  He held that the reach of the power to make secondary 
instruments should instead be gauged by the ‘degree of specificity of the UN 
decision which the UK is called upon to implement’ and also ‘the extent to which 
the implementing measure will interfere with fundamental human rights’.184 Lord 
Brown concluded that secondary legislation could impose ‘very considerable 
restrictions’ so long as it was ‘in all important respects clearly and categorically 
mandated by the UN measure which it is purporting to implement’.185 If such an 
Order went beyond the scope of the UN measure, the Ex parte Simms principle 
meant ‘it can only properly be introduced by primary legislation’.186 
There are several common threads in the reasoning of Lord Hope and Lord 
Phillips. The first is their clear rejection of any notion that the principle of 
legality necessarily precludes secondary legislation that removes or narrows 
basic rights. In our view, that rejection is clearly correct. Lord Phillips identified 
the reason when he conceded that no part of ‘the principle of legality permits a 
court to disregard an unambiguous expression of Parliament’s intention’.187 It 
follows that, if a statute leaves no doubt that it creates or confers a power to make 
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secondary legislation which undermines basic rights, the statute must be given 
effect to the extent that it clearly grants that power. But Lord Phillips and Lord 
Brown were each clearly reluctant to construe such powers expansively, whether 
by requiring very precise alignment between a UN Security Council resolution 
(as Lord Brown suggested) or simply falling back on the core of Ex parte Simms 
and reading the power to make secondary legislation with great strictness (as 
Lord Phillips suggested).  
That same level of interpretive strictness was not, arguably, applied in the 
Australian cases of Evans and the judgment of French CJ in City of Adelaide 
considered above. In both instances the broad lawmaking powers at issue did not 
expressly provide the authority to infringe fundamental rights but were held to 
support the validity of the impugned secondary legislation which did so. We 
argued that such a construction was consistent with the proper relationship 
between the principle of legality and secondary legislation if the relevant powers 
authorised by necessary implication the infringement of fundamental rights in 
those contexts. In City of Adelaide, for example, the application of the principle 
of legality to the local government (convenience) power by French CJ meant that 
the relevant by-law was only within power if it sought to regulate the mode or 
circumstances of the proposed speech not its content. That approach struck a 
sensible balance between freedom of speech and the use and enjoyment of public 
roads in that context. It reduced also the legal complexity of councils discharging 
their core local government functions and probably saved from invalidity a 
myriad of similar by-laws as a consequence.  
However, as the case analysis undertaken above makes clear, the principle of 
legality is often applied, and with some strictness, to the construction of 
secondary lawmaking powers. When Lord Hoffmann restated and reinvigorated 
the principle in Ex parte Simms, he did so in just such a case. That may  
explain Lord Hoffmann’s rationale of the principle, namely that a strict and 
cautionary approach to legislation affecting rights was necessary because there 
was ‘too great a risk that the full implications of their unqualified meaning may 
have passed unnoticed in the democratic process’.188 That concern is especially 
pronounced in cases involving secondary legislation. Parliament may authorise 
the making of secondary legislation, scrutinise secondary legislation and exercise 
a power of disallowance over secondary legislation but it does not directly 
consider or make it. Accordingly, secondary legislation is made without the 
benefit of parliamentary debate and the political and public attention that often 
accompanies those debates. The fact that Parliament’s gaze over secondary 
legislation is not as strong as it is over primary legislation may go some way to 
explaining why the principle of legality has come to the fore in so many cases 
concerning secondary legislation. Perhaps the courts are drawing attention to, and 
to some extent undertaking themselves, the level of scrutiny that might have 
occurred at the parliamentary level if the secondary legislation under 
consideration had proceeded as primary legislation.  
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There is, then, in our view some merit in the argument that the principle of 
legality ought to be applied more strictly in the circumstances of secondary 
legislation. What might that mean as an interpretive and practical matter for the 
courts and Parliament? Judges may well be justified in giving the necessary 
implication aspect of the principle a very narrow sphere of operation in the 
construction of secondary lawmaking powers. Such an approach would, 
arguably, be consistent with the High Court’s authoritative pronouncement on 
this point in Coco in any event:  
Sometimes it is said that a presumption about legislative intention can be 
displaced only by necessary implication but that statement does little more than 
emphasize that the test is a very stringent one … [I]n some circumstances the 
presumption may be displaced by an implication if it is necessary to prevent the 
statutory provisions from becoming inoperative or meaningless. However, it 
would be very rare for general words in a statute to be rendered inoperative or 
meaningless if no implication of interference with fundamental rights were made, 
as general words will almost always be able to be given some operation, even if 
that operation is limited in scope.189 
If this approach was routinely taken by Australian courts it would require as a 
practical matter that Parliaments expressly provide in secondary lawmaking 
powers the extent to which the infringement of fundamental rights is authorised. 
To do so as a drafting matter would not be especially difficult. In the local 
council context, for example, the relevant (convenience) power might read as 
follows: 
1. A Council may make by-laws for or with respect to any act, matter or 
thing of which the Council has a discretion, duty, function or power 
under this or any other Act.  
2. Where it is reasonable and appropriate, the power under (1) may be 
exercised by Council to make by-laws which remove or restrict any or all 
common law rights or freedoms, including any or all rights or freedoms 
recognised as fundamental at common law.  
Such a clause would authorise the making of by-laws that removed rights 
including ones that were regarded at common law to be basic or fundamental, as 
well as other ‘lesser’ common law rights. As the clause refers to rights in the 
plural sense, the principle of legality could not be invoked to interpret the clause 
as allowing the restriction or removal of only one right. That caution seems 
sensible as one can reasonably assume that, if such by-laws were thought 
necessary, they would not be narrow in focus because it is very likely that by-
laws would have to exclude more than one right in order to achieve the desired 
objective. Moreover, a judicial approach that required this level of specificity in 
secondary lawmaking powers makes good on Lord Hoffman’s exhortation that 
‘the principle of legality means that Parliament must squarely confront what it is 
doing and accept the political cost’.190 This may, as a consequence, improve the 
clarity and rights sensitivity of primary lawmaking powers and the secondary 
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legislation that it authorises. In doing so, it would serve to promote the 
democracy and rule of law values that now, arguably, underpin the contemporary 
justification for the principle of legality as articulated in the seminal cases of 
Coco and Ex parte Simms.191  
 
VIII   CONCLUSION 
The principle of legality has assumed a central role in statutory interpretation 
and the protection of common law rights, freedoms and principles. While the 
principle has been identified as a longstanding one, the judicial sharpening of it 
has a more modern pedigree. The principle is generally thought of as one that 
governs the interpretation of statutes – or primary legislation, as statutes may be 
contrasted to the secondary legislation examined in this article – but the principle 
is very often called into play in the interpretation of secondary legislation that is 
made under primary legislation.  
This article has sought to clarify that the proper relationship between the 
principle of legality and secondary legislation in contemporary Australian law is 
as follows: rights, freedoms and principles considered fundamental at common 
law can only be infringed by secondary legislation if the empowering statute 
provides that power expressly or by necessary implication. Otherwise the 
secondary legislation must be read down to protect the right, freedom or principle 
in play or it is ultra vires the lawmaking power if that is not interpretively 
possible. Further, we suggested that the courts might well be justified in giving 
the necessary implication aspect of the principle a very narrow sphere of 
operation in the construction of secondary lawmaking powers. The common 
feature of all forms of secondary legislation is that Parliament itself does not 
consider or enact it. So to require a high level of specificity in the context of 
secondary lawmaking powers recognises that fact of the (secondary) legislative 
process and compels Parliament, if it wishes to authorise the infringement of 
fundamental rights, to meet the challenge posed by Lord Hoffmann, of plainly 
facing its action and assuming the necessary political responsibility. This 
interpretive approach would promote the democracy and rule of law values that 
underpin the contemporary justification for the principle of legality in Australian 
law by requiring Parliaments to consider and then consciously decide whether or 
not it wishes to authorise the infringement of fundamental rights by secondary 
legislation.  
We consider that the role of the principle of legality in cases concerning 
secondary legislation can be explained by something akin to the ‘traditional role’ 
of the courts in statutory interpretation.192 That approach is neither radical nor at 
odds with basic constitutional principles. It is not radical because the application 
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of the principle to secondary legislation was well settled within Australian law 
long before its modern reinvigoration. It is entirely consistent with constitutional 
principles because it ultimately requires the courts to interpret legislation and 
ensure that those who act under statutory powers remain within the limits of that 
power. If that approach also enables, indeed requires, the courts to carefully 
examine both powers to make secondary legislation and whether secondary 
legislation remains within the scope of that power, the approach is unremarkable. 
What is remarkable is that this approach not only allows a rigorous judicial 
principle to regulate Parliament in its lawmaking function, but also the other 
agencies of government, such as local councils, which exercise a somewhat 
similar role in their secondary lawmaking function. The reach of the principle of 
legality over that function, to ensure the protection of rights, freedoms and 
principles considered fundamental at common law, is surely correct.  
 
 
 
